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[Paper ® rst received April 1997; in ® nal form February 1998]
ABSTRACT This paper demonstrates how formal housing ® nance is the product of the
perceptions that prevail among the middle and upper classes, who as policy-makers,
econom ists and managers, determ ine how housing ® nance institutions ® x the terms and
conditions of housing loans for the urban poor. They use affordability criteria that ® t the
purchase or construction of a house in one go. However, affordability criteria for the
urban poor have to be linked with practices of incremental building and consequently
incremental ® nancing. Failing to do so leads to serious m ismatches between the demand
and supply of formal housing ® nance for the urban poor. To be able to serve the poor
adequately, the middle and upper classes should stop aiming at the ® nancing of housing
constructed in one go. Instead, they should open their m inds to the building and
® nancing practices of the urban poor.
Introduction
In order to serve the Indian urban poor, affordability criteria for providing
housing loans are used by the private and public housing ® nance sector.
However, at the roots of affordability criteria different perceptions concerning
the construction and the ® nancing of housing can be traced among different
groups in society. Middle and other upper classes are inclined to construct
complete housing units in one go, while the urban poor tend to build their
houses step by step. The construction of complete dwelling units requires large
housing loans, often associated with a long repayment term. Incremental build-
ing requires incremental ® nancingÐ relatively small loans preferably with a
short to medium term. Incremental building and ® nancing can function as a
vehicle for economic progress for the urban poor. Large housing loans to be
repaid over the long term, however, jeopardise this economic progress and can
even worsen the living conditions of the poor. As long as the middle and other
upper classes working in formal housing ® nance institutions are not aware of
the notions of the urban poor regarding building and ® nancing, the poor will not
be helped at all. There is a need to change the of® cial perceptions of how the
poor should build and ® nance their dwellings, which could also improve the
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recovery of the loans. The next step has to be an adjustment of policy; otherwise
there will be a serious mismatch between the applied and required affordability
criteria concerning housing ® nance for the urban poor. Moreover, it will be
shown that it is possible to ® nance dwellings for the poor without seriously
jeopardising their survival strategies.
This paper ® rst looks at affordability criteria. Second, the concepts of in-
cremental building and incremental ® nancing will be discussed. Third, the
survival strategies of the urban poor will be dealt with. This will be followed by
a description of public and private housing ® nance for the urban poor in India.
Finally, an attempt will be made to break away from perceptions concerning
housing ® nance which are suitable only for the dominant middle and other
upper classes, and alternative ones will be proposed.
Affordability Criteria in a Nutshe ll
The living conditions of the urban poor in developing countries are generally
characterised by substandard shelter and unhealthy neighbourhoods. Initially,
policies dealt with ready-made housing and the construction of houses based on
self-help. Gradually the focus shifted to include the land issue and housing
® nance. Efforts are made to reach the urban poor with formal housing ® nance,
but the poor are only reached with great dif® culty, if at all. Even if the efforts
appear to be successful, cost recovery remains problematic, for which the urban
poor are often blamed.
In this respect, the concept of affordability is of crucial importance. Housing
® nance will only be provided if the lender is largely sure the loan will be repaid.
The affordable size of a housing loan is generally determined by taking into
account the capital costs required, its ® nancing terms, the size and regularity of
the household income and physical possessions, and the propensity to consume
housing . Conventionally it is thought that if the capital costs, ® nancing terms
and household income are known, the propensity to buy housing or the
willingness to invest in the dwelling will follow automatically (Lee, 1990, p. 64).
Hancock (1993, p. 129), by referring to Bramley, is more speci® c and states that
housing is only affordable for households if after deduction of the housing
costsÐ rent or repayment of a housing loan Ð suf ® cient means are left over to
provide the necessities of life without falling below the poverty line. A typical
house can be made affordable by means of subsidy. However, this option is
rather limited for Third World cities due to the scale of their housing problems
and a shortage of ® nancial means.
Apart from viewing affordability as an income problem, it can also be seen as
a housing market problem. First, government intervention tends to be geared
towards adjusting the denominator of the rent-to-income ratio. If housing
affordability is considered a market problem, it refers to a government role
concerning the physical provision of housing (Linneman & Megbolugbe, 1992,
p. 387).
Discussions about affordable housing are not a new phenomenon; they started
at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century in the
so-called Western world. It was stated that `one week’ s pay for one month’s rent’
could be afforded. Later on, mortgage lenders started using a housing expendi-
ture-to-income ratio, which more or less assumes how much an average house-
hold is able to spend on housing , which is a maximum 25± 30 per cent of their
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Housing Finance for the Urban Poor in India 823
income. These ratios, in fact rule of thumb measures, are used for various
purposes. They can be used for describing a typical household expenditure
pattern, for analysing administrative rules for allocating subsidies, de® ning
housing needs, public policy purposes, predicting the ability of a household to
pay rent or to repay a mortgage loan, and selecting households for a rental unit
or a mortgage loan. However, these ratios are increasingly criticised, because of
the inaccuracy of de ® ning the actual income of a household and predicting the
willingness of the bene® ciaries to allocate a speci® c part of their budget for
housing . In reality, households can be traced which spend more on housing
loans than the ratio indicates (Hulchanski, 1995, pp. 471± 484). Despite the history
of conceptual, theoretical and methodological errors in relation to affordability
ratios they are still in use. Hulchanski therefore suggests that it is crucial to look
into the usage of affordability criteria and what their focus should be in a
speci® c context such as urban India.
Affordability is also of crucial importance for urban India. In 1991 India’ s
urban population was 217 million and had doubled in size since 1971. The urban
population is expected to increase by at least 3.5 per cent per annum, which will
be re¯ ected in a further expansion of the urban area and population. This
population growth has and will continue to put enormous pressure on housing,
the urban infrastructure and the administration, leading to a shortage of housing
and basic facilities. Particularly those living below the poverty line (40 per cent
of the urban population in 1987± 88) face problems of access to existing housing
and basic facilities (Repetto, 1994, pp. 57± 64). The housing agencies ª have not
taken into consideration the demand pattern and affordability of different
sections of the population, particularly those in the lower income strata, in
designing the housing projects. On the other hand, several of these agencies, by
their very mandate and the ® nancial and administrative stipulations guiding
their activities, have explicitly excluded the poorº (Kundu, 1993, p. 62). In the
meantime, attempts are being made to provide the poor with affordable housing
® nance.
Incremental Building and Incremental Financing
Incremental building is the process through which shelter is constructed step by
step. Over a period of time the dwelling will be improved in quality and/or size.
Such incremental building activities are dependent on the individual household
priorities and the means available, and change according to the family cycle or
changes in the life of migrants in the city. As people change continually
throughout their lives, so do their household needs, priorities and possibilities.
In recent decades, incremental building has been taken increasingly seriously as
a successful method by which the urban poor can construct their homes. As an
example, the World Bank took this idea by Turner (e.g. 1968, 1972), more or less
seriously by incorporating some incremental building principles into their urban
lending programme in the 1970s that resulted in, for example, sites and services
pilot projects (see e.g. Gilbert, 1994, pp. 140± 141; Nientied & van der Linden,
1988).
Very often, however, the implications of incremental building for housing
® nance are not worked out in detail. For instance, a World Bank policy paper
only indicates that ª small-scale mutual credit institutions and alternative lending
instruments attuned to the needs of households undertaking incremental house-
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building, should be encouragedº (World Bank, 1993, p. 122). However, it has to
be realised that incremental building requires smaller loan amounts and often a
shorter repayment term. Most conventional bankers are, however, hesitant about
dealing with such types of loans due to, for example, their high overhead costs,
and their unfamiliarity with the urban poor as clients . The main exceptions are
the so-called `people’s banks’ and most informal ® nancial arrangements. In this
respect, Merrett & Russell (1994, p. 61) write: ª non-conventional ® nance can be
de ® ned as credit for the self-build process which does not share these character-
istics of conventional ® nanceº . As yet there is no agreement among conventional
® nancial institutions about the fact that incremental building requires methods
of incremental ® nancing (smaller loans with a preferable short to medium term).
Malpezzi (1994) has taken the concepts of incremental ® nancing for incremental
building more seriously. He argues that
¼ very few households approach housing other than incrementally, in
the sense of paying for their housing in parts, whether rich or poor
households in rich or poor countries. What is desirable is to divorce
incremental payment from incremental consumption, so that house-
holds can consume their desired bundle, or closer to it, sooner. ¼ The
existence of ® nancial and rental intermediation implies that consump-
tion decisions can be made less dependent on current income and more
dependent on long run (`permanent’) income, and long run desired
consumption. What is required, then, is the collateral development of
housing ® nance and of private rental markets as the construction
market moves downmarket. (Malpezzi, p. 459)
In other words, Malpezzi argues that decisions concerning the construction of
shelter would become more ef® cient if ® nancial decisions could be separated
from building decisions (production of shelter). This would open opportunities
for building and consuming now and paying for it later. This means that a
(potential) house owner who has taken out a housing loan, constructs or buys a
house and enjoys its bene® ts as soon as possible or even directly. Paying for it
later takes the form of repaying the housing loan. In the case of tenants, others
will build the house and rent should be paid as long as they are living in the
house concerned. Tenants and house owners start consuming immediately and
genera lly have to pay for it over a long period of time. Malpezzi suggests that
it is better to enjoy the bene ® ts of a complete housing unit now instead of
consuming it incrementally and enjoying more or less the same bene ® ts some-
time in the future. This is possible because all income groups pay incrementally
for their shelter . The notion that incremental building should be divorced from
incremental ® nancing, and the feasibility of renting for the poorest sections of
society, will be challenged in this paper.
Incremental Building and Financing as a Survival Strategy
The material used in this section was gathered in 1993± 94 in 13 slums, where no
housing schemes have been initiated, in the twin cities of Hyderabad and
Secunderabad (subsequently referred to as Hyderabad). In these neighbour-
hoods, a survey was carried out by interview ing households that were selected
by requesting the co-operation of a person whose household lived behind a door
facing the street. When co-operation was refused the next door was tried until
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Housing Finance for the Urban Poor in India 825
we succeeded, even if we had to pass several doors. After completing an
interview the ® fth door was selected for the next interview. The information
gathered through questionnaires was supplemented with information from
local leaders, ® nancial agents and informal talks. In 1996 some households were
revisited. For a more elaborated discussion see Smets (1996).
First, there should be some clari® cation about what is meant by the `urban
poor’ . The Indian `urban poor’ can be distinguished as the so-called Economi-
cally Weaker Sections (EWS) with a monthly household income of less than
Rs. 1250 and the Low Income Groups (LIG) with a household income of
Rs. 1251± 2650 a month (one Indian Rupee (Rs.) equals US$0.033 (1993± 94)).
The urban poor have developed survival strategies, by which is meant,
broadly, ª the ways in which poor households organise their production and
consumption activities to guarantee the maintenance of their membersº (Chant,
1991, p. 26). While survival strategies do not imply that actors always make
rational choices, these strategies give an indication of how the poor in distress
cope with the challenges within their household against the background of their
poverty (De Wit, 1993, p. 21). The strategies that are used by some for sheer
survival can be used by others to improve their living conditions. Such strate-
gies have become mobility strategies or what Stree¯ and (1989, p. 24) calls
ª modes of improvementº . Compared with mobility strategies, survival strate-
gies encompass a lower divers ity of activities, a shorter time horizon of plan-
ning and a smaller income (Schmink, 1984, pp. 90± 91).
For the context of this paper different kinds of survival can be distinguished :
physical, psychological, and socio-economic survival, which may in various
ways be interdependent. Physical and psychological survival are mainly indi-
vidual and deal with continuity of life under sometimes severe circumstances
and challenges threatening life such as in refugee camps and in famine-stricken
areas. Socio-economic survival encompasses the struggles of individuals or
households to maintain a certain position in society, for which relationships in
that society must be maintained. This form of survival is more clearly embed-
ded in social relations (Stree¯ and, 1989, pp. 22± 28). Survival strategies may
differ within the same household because the personal needs of some members
of the household may con¯ ict with the overall needs of the household. Further-
more, these strategies may differ among different households, because they are
dependent on the amount and regularity of income, size of the household, age
of the household’s members, changes in migrant’ s life, etc. However, some
genera l characteristics can still be given. The poor try to ® nance their essential
needs such as food, clothes and shelter from their own ( ® nancial) means, from
credit or from social security mechanisms. Such credit is often obtained from the
informal sector, with ª all ® nancial transactions, loans and deposits, occurring
outside the regulation of a central monetary or ® nancial market authorityº
(Adams & Fitchett, 1992, p. 2). However, people who are dependent on survival
strategies try to avoid debts as much as possible and when they incur debts they
opt for keeping their period of indebtedness as short as possible to be able to
cope with other pressing needs such as food, education of the children, travel to
the place of work and medicines. Ultimately, ª repeated short-term loans enable
the borrower to adjust periodically the outstanding debt to available household
income, so that the debt/income ratio is not excessiveº (Merrett & Russell, 1994,
p. 64). An example will be given below of a short-term shelter improvement
strategy of a typical poor female-headed household in Hyderabad:
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
6:
46
 1
2 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
826 Peer Smets
Table 1. Expenditure priorities of slum dwellers in Hyderabad
Items of priority Total
Priority 1 food (85%), rent (9%) 94%
Priority 2 clothing (29%), food (13%), rent (13%), education (12%), loan repayment 79%
(7%), med ical care (5%)
Priority 3 clothing (20%), medical care (18%), education (12%), loan repayment (9%), 66%
rent (7%)
Priority 4 medical care (18%), clothing (13%), education (11%), networking (9%), loan 69%
repayment (7%), saving (6%), personal expenses (5%)
Priority 5 medical care (12%), saving (10%), networking (8%), she lter (8%), clothing 57%
(7%), education (6%), loan repayment (6%)
Source : own research (n 5 230, missing cases 14)
A woman of 35 years old and her four children (two boys of 12 and 7,
and two girls of 9 and 4) live in a hut. She survives by begging while
carrying around pictures of several Hindu Gods. Daily she collects
Rs. 7± 8, which is scarcely enough to buy a daily portion of rice. Their hut
is built on a piece of land squatted on when her husband was still alive.
In 1994 the hut was partly washed away by the rains, but was rebuilt
with the help of ® ve neighbours, who were willing to do the work for
relatively little ; [they received] tea in exchange. Luckily enough she was
able to buy from them some second hand bamboo mats to construct
some temporary walls. These mats cost Rs. 350, which has to be repaid
in a lump sum within a period of two months. For that purpose she has
a cloth in which she puts a few rupees every day. The expectation is that
when the means are available, mud walls will be constructed again.
Obviously not all households and their members have the same needs and
priorities . Consequently, people do not automatically spend their surplus, if
available, on shelter and they take decisions in accordance with a short-term
planning framework.
To obtain more detail about the spending behaviour of slum dwellers in
Hyderabad, the respondents were asked to give a list of items in order of
priority. For an overview of these priorities see Table 1. In the interest of clarity
only items with a minimum score of 5 per cent are included. This explains why
the last column does not include a total score of 100 per cent. Table 1 also shows
that the priorities set by households differ. In this respect, it is remarkable that
investments in shelter are only mentioned as their ® fth priority by 8 per cent of
the households interviewed. Rent payments have a much higher priority (9 per
cent as ® rst priority , 13 per cent as second priority and 7 per cent as third
priority) . The loan repayments reported concern non-housing loans, which have
a higher priority than investments in shelter.
To illustrate this overview of expenditure priorities, an example follows of the
spending behaviour of a household where husband and wife co-operate in
® nancial matters. Here, both are eager to make decisions concerning their
expenditure by mutual agreement. In this household the following in order of
priority was traced:
(1) food,
(2) medical expenses ,
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Housing Finance for the Urban Poor in India 827
(3) education of the children,
(4) receiving relatives/visiting relatives,
(5) clothes.
The fourth priority needs some further explanation. Receiving and visiting
relatives requires investment in food, drinks and possibly gifts. Investment in
these relationships is of crucial importance for the poor to secure help in the
event of an emergency.
When credit is taken out, the repayment often takes ® rst or second priority.
This implies that the other priorities will be pushed down the list. It should be
realised that the list of priorities is not as rigid as it may seem . On each item it
is possible to economise to be able to cope with other expenditures , but these
opportunities are rather limited. In order to meet other needs the poor opt for
a short period of indebtedness. For this period other pressing needs can be
postponed until the debt is repaid. For the same reason the poor prefer to live
in rent-free shelter, even when the only remaining option is to live in very poor
accommodation to avoid long-term deduction from their income, which reduces
the opportunity of meeting other needs. A street hawker in Hyderabad ex-
plained it as follows:
We could not afford to pay rent because I did a job on a temporary
basis.
Thus, the poor try to secure their survival in the future by maintaining their
¯ exibility as much as possible. Obviously the management of the household
budget becomes more problematic when one of the household members, often
the male, does not take responsibility for the household and prioritises his
personal expenditures by visiting cinemas, drink ing liquor, or smoking
cigarettes. The consequences of such sel® sh behaviour are illustrated by the
words of a female slum dweller in Hyderabad:
My husband is a guide for lorry drivers in the city. I do not know how
much income he gets. I get Rs. 200 a month from him (which is far less
than his income). He drinks too much. So I have to wash up at houses
nearby. They pay me Rs. 200 a month. Furthermore, I have to do my
housework and look after my four children. I face a lot of problems.
In terms of daily expenses the poor have short-term perspectives, which are also
mirrored in their investments in shelter . These investments are needed for land,
building materials, tools and construction skills. If these elements are not at hand
they can be obtained through exchange or purchase. The limited means available
force the poor to build their houses a little at a time, which is one of their
survival strategies. In this way shelter becomes affordable for them. By building
and improving their shelter when it is considered convenient, the poor generally
try to improve their living conditions as will be illustrated by the following
example of a household, classi® ed as being from a low-income group.
In 1994, Ramesh, a low-grade government employee, lived together
with his wife Radhika and three children in government quarters for
which Rs. 500 was deducted from his salary of Rs. 2300. He also
worked as an agent for the Peerless Finance and General Investment
Company and could make an additional Rs. 200± 300 a month. In 1992
he illegally bought a 160 square yards plot of land on the outskirts of
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the Hyderabad for Rs. 12 000. This was ® nanced by interest-bearing
loans (total Rs. 6000) from friends. The remaining amount was saved
through a chit fund (ROSCA). The ch it fund in which Ramesh partici-
pates is an auction ROSCA (rotating savings and credit association) for
which he has to pay a monthly ® xed contribution for a determined
period. All participants pay a monthly ® xed amount to the kitty and
will obtain the common fund once during a cycle. During meetings
participants have to bid for the fund by offering the highes t discount on
the kitty. This deducted amount will be divided among all participants
and the receiver of the fund obtains the remaining amount. Once a
participant has received the kitty, he is not allowed to partake in
subsequent bidding activities .
In 1994 the family decided to move to a rented dwelling near their
plot, for which they had to pay Rs. 100 monthly. From this house
without electricity, water and sanitation they could keep an eye on their
plot and prevent occupation by others. In the mean time, Ramesh saved
through a chit fund and could allocate the rent allowance that earlier
had been deducted from his salary to contributions in a chit fund . After
having accumulated enough funds the construction of his own dwell-
ing took place between February and October 1995. It is a concrete
house with two small rooms and a very small kitchen . A wall sur-
rounds the plot and a bathroom and toilet were constructed on the
premises. The total costs were Rs. 100 000. The ® nancial sources were
an advance of Ramesh’s provident fund (Rs. 20 000), Rs. 30 000 and
Rs. 9000 from two different chit funds, and two loans of Rs. 10 000 each
from two of Ramesh’s sisters. He borrowed a total of Rs. 10 000 from
colleagues and two loans of Rs. 5000 were taken out from moneylen-
ders. For the repayment of the loans savings will be accumulated in a
chit fund . Once the fund is obtained the loan will be repaid. As soon as
the construction activities started Ramesh stopped his job with Peerless
and the family started selling chicken meat in the backyard of their
house. Ramesh said that a further extension of the house would be
postponed until all loans are repaid and the marriage of their daughter
has been ® nanced. In the meantime Ramesh is thinking of renting out
a part of his plot to a school which recently started up in the neighbour-
hood.
An incremental way of building opens opportunities for converting the
survival strategies of the poor into mobility strategies. The implication of this is
that the shelter of the urban poor should not be judged solely by present
physical appearance, but by what each potentially means for its users (Turner,
1976, p. 61). Shelter can have several meanings for the urban poor. An urban
dwelling may serve as a substitute for status derived from the possession of
material (e.g. cattle, tools and irrigation facilities) or ancestry symbols (Alcock et
al., 1963, p. 85). It can also serve as collateral for credit from, for example,
moneylenders, pawnbrokers, relatives, friends, and neighbours. A slum dweller
in Hyderabad explained it as follows:
If he (the moneylender) does not know us and our house, he will not
provide a loan. Even if we want to pawn a golden ornament, he will be
hesitant in accepting it if he does not know that we are living in our
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Housing Finance for the Urban Poor in India 829
own house. This will give him some guarantee that the ornament is not
stolen. If it is stolen he may get problems with the police. Then he can
easily ® nd us and take action.
The importance of being an owner occupant to obtain a loan more easily is also
illustrated by van der Linden (1983, p. 73) who quotes a slum dweller in Karachi:
Everybody around us knows that I have spent Rs. 3000 on this house.
So my neighbours know that I would not run away, and when my wife
had to be admitted to the hospital, I could borrow from my neighbours.
Furthermore, the urban poor are often refused as participants in a chit fund if
they are not owner occupants. The security function of the dwelling is especially
important for the poor when traditional means of social security such as local
networks based on kinship, are eroded and access to institutionalised security is
lacking. The security derived from one’s own dwelling is minimised if the
shelter concerned is under long-term ® nancial obligations. For migrant squatters
the house often serves as a source of socio-economic security, enabling help from
slum dwellers and participation in community-based organisations. The reasons
mentioned above and the earlier mentioned avoidance of long-term ® nancial
obligations explain why the poor prefer to have their own dwelling, even when
it is a hut or shack, instead of renting one. Tenants do not have the house as
security and may run away after having taken out an informal loan.
Variable income and a ¯ exible expenditure pattern mean that no indication
can be given of what proportion of their income poor people can, and are willing
to, spend for their habitat (Turner, 1976, p. 37). In genera l, credit taken out by the
urban poor is for relatively small amounts, for a short or medium term and with
high interest rates. It could be suggested that borrowers are prepared to pay a
high rate of interest when they can get access to quick and ¯ exible ® nancial
services (Holt & Ribe, 1991, p. 16). The focus of the paper will now shift to
formal housing ® nance for the urban poor.
Formal Housing Finance for the Urban Poor in India
In India, formal housing ® nance can be provided through public or private
institutions. Examples of public and private housing ® nance for the poor in
Hyderabad will be discussed. Public housing ® nance encompasses project
® nance, while private housing ® nance refers to individual as well as project
® nance.
The material used for the analysis of public housing ® nance was gathered in
seven slums in Hyderabad, where EWS schemes had been implemented or were
still under implementation. The methods used are similar to those mentioned in
the previous section. Moreover, interviews took place with employees of the
national agency, the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO),
the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and the Housing Board and the
Andhra Pradesh Urban Development & Housing Corporation. For a more
detailed analysis of the public housing schemes, see Smets (1995).
The material in this section on private housing ® nance is based on interviews
with employees of the Housing Finance Corporations in Hyderabad (HDFC,
Can ® n Homes Ltd., LIC Housing Finance Ltd., Dewan Housing Finance Devel-
opment Ltd., GIC Housing Finance Ltd., AB Homes Finance Ltd., Vysya Bank
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Table 2. Composition of the unit costs
Loan Rs. 11 700
Subsidy Rs. 1 000
Bene ® ciary contribution Rs. 300
Minimum additional investments required Rs. 5 000
Unit costs Rs. 18 000
Housing Finance Ltd., Fairgrowth Home Finance Ltd.), and the head of® ce of the
HDFC in Bombay. Discussions with NHB staff in New Delhi also took place.
This is supplemented with information collected from lea¯ ets from the ® nancial
institutions concerned and (un)published literature. Parts of this section are
taken from Smets (1997).
Public Housing Finance
Public housing ® nance for the urban poor is provided by HUDCO for the
implementation of housing schemes for various income groups, such as the
Economically Weaker Sections (EWS). In reality many Low-Income Group (LIG)
households could be traced in the EWS housing scheme houses. In Hyderabad
the Andhra Pradesh Urban Development and Housing Corporation (APUD &
HC) and the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad implement the EWS housing
schemes.
Nowadays, only multi-storeyed buildings are built through the EWS housing
schemes in Hyderabad, for which suf® ciently strong foundations and pillars are
required. If the bene ® ciary lacks construction skills labour has to be employed.
After completion of the shell structure the house has to be completed by means
of self-help.
To keep the unit costs of an EWS house low, land is provided free to the
bene® ciaries and some building materials are subsidised. Furthermore, the state
government of Andhra Pradesh provides a subsidy of Rs. 1000 to the bene ® ciary
after completion of the house. However, before a bene® ciary can participate in
an EWS housing scheme an admission fee of Rs. 61 has to be paid. Later, the
housing loan of Rs. 11 700 is provided and secured by mortgaging the title deed.
The credit bears a subsidised interest rate of 10 per cent p.a. and has to be repaid
in monthly instalments of Rs. 98 over a period of 20 years. The housing loan is
made affordable for the poor by subsidising the interest rate and lengthening the
term to 240 months. The government has ® xed the unit costs at Rs. 13 000, but
also state that at least Rs. 5000 is required to complete the housing unit. In other
words, the of® cially determined unit cost of Rs. 13 000 is far too low. For an
overview of unit costs see Table 2.
The recovery of the government loans is very poor. For urban and rural
Andhra Pradesh the recovery performance of the housing loans was 5.1 per cent
of the total amount due up to 1992± 93 (GAP, 1994, p. 55). For 1993± 94 the
recovery rate of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad varied from 7.04 to
15.86 per cent. One cause of this low recovery rate is that the EWS housing
schemes are highly politicised. Houses are allocated through politicians, while
other of® cials are responsible for the recovery of the housing loans provided.
Politicians encourage the bene ® ciaries, who often do not belong to the target
group, to refrain from repaying the loan. In this way vote banks are created and
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maintained. Politics is not the only cause of the poor repayment record. The
bene® ciaries give a higher priority to repaying the private housing loans, which
are needed to ® nish their houses in an EWS housing scheme. The ® nance for the
additional investment of at least Rs. 5000 for completing the house has to be
covered by savings , gifts from friends and relatives, credit from friends, relatives
and moneylenders or derived from savings and credit associations. In practice,
these sources of ® nance are used alone or in combination with one another.
Moreover, the concept of affordability as used in this scheme may be questioned,
and can be illustrated by complaints that were commonly expressed by
bene® ciaries in Hyderabad.
My hut was good. When we were living there it was good. When the
scheme started we were surrounded by loans.
Why did I have to leave my old house, which had mud walls and an
asbestos roof? When I was living in it, I was happy. Now I have a nice
house but I am terribly in debt. How can I get my children married
with all these loans outstanding?
It appeared that the poor have different priorities from the policy-makers. The
urban poor consider ¯ exibility in their expenditure pattern of greater importance
than living in a `beautiful’ house which makes them indebted for a long period.
Private Housing Finance
Private housing ® nance corporations are promoted, regulated and supported by
the National Housing Bank (NHB). The NHB aims to mobilise household
savings through promoting savings-linked housing ® nance schemes, facilitating
access to institutional housing ® nance, and increasing the supply and improving
the use of scarce land and building materials (NHB, 1990, pp. 1 ± 4). According to
the NHB guidelines and directions, housing ® nance corporations have to focus
primarily on the provision of housing loans for the construction or purchase of
residential houses in India. Credit for the enlargement or repair of houses has to
be a minor activity. Moreover, lending has to take place on terms and conditions
considered adequate by the housing ® nance corporations within the framework
set by the National Housing Bank. According to the framework, the interest rate
is dependent on the size of the individual loans and not directly on a speci® c
target group. Housing ® nance corporations may charge a maximum interest rate
of 12 per cent p.a. for credit up to Rs. 25 000 and for loans from Rs. 25 001±
100 000 a maximum of 14.5 per cent p.a. Housing ® nance corporations are free
to ® x the interest rate for loans above Rs. 100 000. The smaller housing loans are
made cheaper by cross-subsidising the interest rate. The underlying assumption
is that such credit will be affordable for the poor. Initial charges, excluding
registration charges for documents and stamp duty, to a maximum of 2 per cent
of a housing loan are charged to cover the overhead cost of checking the title
deeds and administration costs (NHB, 1991, pp. 2 ± 7).
Apart from the provision of individual housing loans, the NHB also ® nances
public and private housing schemes. For an overview of the interest rates on
public and private housing loans see Table 3. In slum redevelopment schemes
incremental building on a low-cost basis is encouraged. For each unit, credit can
be provided to a maximum of 80 per cent of the unit costs or Rs. 45 000. The
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Table 3. Interest rates for loans with effect from 1 May 1994
Loan size Interest rate p.a. charged by
For new units & those allotted NHB’s land NHB (re ® nance) HFCs
development and shelter projects
up to Rs. 25 000 10.00 (® xed) 12.00 (maximum)
Rs. 25 00± 100 000 14.25 (® xed) 15.50 (maximum)
Rs. 100 000± 200 000 14.25 (® xed) *
For upgrades
up to Rs. 30 000 14.25 (® xed) 15.50 (maximum)
Project loans
public agencies 15.50 16.50
housing co-operatives 15.50 16.50
rental housing 17.00 18.00
professional developers 17.00 18.50
Note : * HFCs are free to decide the interest rates for these loans.
credit, with a term of 15 years, requires the mortgaging of the property or a
government guarantee. Table 4 provides an overview of the interest rates in
effect for credit for slum redevelopment schemes. In practice, housing ® nance for
the EWS schemes in Hyderabad only comes directly from HUDCO, because the
project loans from the housing ® nance corporations are considered too expens-
ive.
Housing ® nance corporations are encouraged to serve the poor through the
re ® nancing facilities of the NHB, who can provide credit to a housing ® nance
corporation after it has provided speci® c loans to the poor. Recognised housing
® nance corporations, who provide credit for the purchase of a new house with
a built-up area of a maximum of 40 square metres or a maximum of Rs. 150 000
for costs, including land, can claim re® nance from the NHB. Furthermore, credit
up to Rs. 30 000 can be completely re® nanced if it is to be used for upgrading
a house (NHB, 1991, p. 8). Re® nancing will take place at a lower interest rate
than the rate charged by the housing ® nance corporations. The National Hous-
ing Bank levies 1.25 to 2 per cent less than the maximum interest rate charged
by the housing ® nance corporations for that speci® c loan. For example, individ-
ual housing loans up to Rs. 25 000 can be re® nanced at 10 per cent p.a., which
is 2 per cent below the 12 per cent p.a. charged by the housing ® nance
corporations. This difference is the pro® t margin for the housing ® nance corpo-
rations on such a housing loan. The term of the loans is 5± 20 years and the
average loan:value ratio is 51± 75 per cent (Struyk & Ravicz, 1992, p. 76). The
remaining amount has to be paid by the bene® ciary himself.
Table 4. Interest rates for shelter
improvement in a slum redevelop-
ment scheme with effect from 1 May
1994
Loan size Interest rate
up to Rs. 25 000 9%
Rs. 25 001± Rs. 45 000 12%
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Housing ® nance corporations are not very eager to provide small loans.
Smaller loans require higher overhead costs while the prescribed interest rate is
smaller. On account of the small or even negative pro® t margin, the provision
of small loans is not at all popular among housing ® nance corporations who are
not very eager to provide them and tend to keep to larger loans, which are
meant for the better off. In relation to the poor, housing ® nance corporations
make use of unsuitable credit terms and conditions , such as relatively long-term
credit, and tight methods of repayment. Furthermore, the methods of repayment
often con¯ ict with the repayment capacity of the poor, which requires some
¯ exibility to overcome periods in which their income drops too much, such as
happens to street hawkers during the rainy period.
The access of the poor to housing ® nance corporations is often constrained by
high transaction costs for the borrower, such as transportation costs to and
through the housing ® nance corporation of® ces, and paperwork expenses. Even
when housing ® nance corporations are located near the residences and work
places of the poor, their ® nancial systems are not suf® ciently tailored to the poor.
Participation in a housing-linked contractual savings scheme does not ensure a
housing loan will be obtained. Participants with home loan accounts have to
deposit savings for a period of ® ve years before being eligible for a housing loan.
However, they still have to prove their capacity to repay in conventional ways.
Apart from dif® culties in measuring their repayment capacity, the urban poor
face other problems in obtaining a housing loan due to, for example, lack of a
marketable title deed for a plot of land and lack of regular and high enough
income.
Housing Finance for the Poor: An Attempt to Break Out of the Trap
Public and private housing ® nance for the urban poor, as described in the
examples, is characterised by mortgage lending, subsidised interest rates, mainly
long-term ® nance, and repayment in equal monthly amounts. The housing loans
are provided to buy a complete dwelling or to construct one. In public sector
housing schemes an incremental method of building is incorporated, but the
ultimate aim is the construction of a complete housing unit, as designed by the
municipal corporation of Hyderabad. Here it is expected that the bene® ciaries
will have to take out a large loan, whose size varies with the different income
groups. To make such a unit affordable for the poor, direct subsidies on
construction costs and/or indirect subsidies on the interest rate are involved.
The formal housing loans are made affordable for the poor by lengthening the
period of repayment by reducing the equated monthly instalments. However,
the implicit assumption is that the income and intention to pay for housing
remains the same during the long period of indebtedness (Lee, 1990, p. 67).
The affordability criteria used by the Indian private housing ® nance sector are
based on minimum income criteria in order to be able to exclude lower-income
groups. The Indian public housing ® nance sector affordability criteria are based
on maximum income criteria to cut off higher-income groups from speci® c
housing and housing ® nance. In this respect, Hulchanski (1995, p. 480) has
traced similar differences in North America.
For individual private sector housing loans, it is assumed that small loans
with a subsidised interest rate will be taken out by the poorer sections of society.
This would potentially enable a process of incremental building, but the housing
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® nance corporations are not very eager to provide these small loans because of
their larger overhead costs and lower interest rate. Furthermore, the poor are
considered to be a high risk because they genera lly lack marketable title deeds
and a regular income that is high enough to pay off the loan. This encourages
the housing ® nance corporations to focus on larger housing loans.
The informal ® nancial sector serves those who are not satis® ed with the
services of the formal sector or those who have no access to these institutions
at all. Informal ® nance institutions are often considered more ef ® cient with
regard to the speed of the transactions, the distribution of credit to many
borrowers rather than a few, the rate of return offered on borrowed funds, the
rate of recovery, and their services. Other advantages of the informal ® nancial
sector are the safeguarding of proper scrutiny of the loan application and
collateral, personal assessment, and follow up action. Regarding the interest
rates charged and the intermediary costs, the informal sector institutions are as
ef® cient as banks (Nayar, 1992, pp. 202± 207). Moreover, contrary to formal
housing ® nance, informal housing ® nance is genera lly characterised by non-
mortgage lending, but by lending that is mainly secured by social control
mechanisms which are in practice effective alternatives for conventional col-
lateral. In an urban setting the ownership of a dwelling , even a hut or shack
without legal title deed, is required to ensure that people who still have
® nancial obligations in a speci® c neighbourhood do not disappear. The interest
rates for informal housing loans are relatively high (3± 10 per cent per month is
no exception) and the term is short to medium.
A popular ® nancial instrument for incremental building is mutual ® nancial
institutions such as the earlier mentioned chit fund , or ROSCA. The ROSCA is
ª a poor man’s institution for accumulation of savingsº (Nayar, 1992, p. 196),
but not exclusively so. In addition to the ¯ exible nature of the ROSCA and its
short term, social control generally successfully encourages the savings behav-
iour of its participants. During a ROSCA cycle participants pool savings on a
regular basis, and this common fund is allocated to each participant in turn.
The ROSCA offers the opportunity to deposit savings and to obtain a lump
sum once during a ROSCA cycle. The welfare of the participants will be raised
by forming a ROSCA ª because some ® nancial intermediation reduces every-
one’s utility cost of saving upº (Besley et al., 1993, p. 797). ROSCAs operate
with social collateral that replaces conventional collateral to a large extent.
Social collateral can take the form of control mechanisms, which require
face-to-face relationships. In an urban environment, people can more easily
escape face-to-face contacts, which can be compensated for by being tied
to a speci® c neighbourhood. Such ties require owner occupant status for the
urban dweller, even when it concerns a shack. Defaulters are excluded
from further participation. The ROSCA is very popular due to its ¯ exible
nature and the possibility of adjustment to the socio-economic, cultural,
and ® nancial needs of the participants in a speci® c environment. The dis-
advantage of ROSCAs is that participation in a ROSCA will only be accepted
if some network is established, which requires the means to do so. Its impli-
cation is that the poorest of the poor will be excluded. Moreover, ROSCA
participants genera lly cannot in¯ uence the moment when they obtain the
common fund. In auction ROSCAs this problem is to a large extent solved by
the introduction of bidding for the kitty. While auction ROSCAs are considered
inferior to credit markets by Besley et al. (1993, p. 808), they are popular among
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the poor, because their micro-® nance nature ® ts their survival and mobility
strategies.
The relatively small size of housing loans from the informal market match the
habit of incremental building. Affordability is considered a dynamic concept,
which enables the poor to build what and when they can afford it. Furthermore,
this enables the extension and improvement of houses over time. In practice, a
short or medium-term loan for an incremental building process better matches
the way of life of the urban poor than a long-term loan for a complete housing
unit. The repayment of a housing loan is dependent on the borrower’s capacity
and willingness to pay. In this respect, it appears that women show more
responsibility concerning the repayment of loans (e.g. Moser, 1992, p. 90). The
ultimate result of the incremental construction of a house may be that it is more
expensive than the construction of the same unit all at once. Although pre-
sumably it helps, affordability does not mean that the credit should be cheap. It
is more important that the credit can be handled. In other words, incremental
building for the urban poor requires incremental ® nancing. This contradicts
Malpezzi’ s idea that incremental building and incremental ® nancing should be
distinguished from each other. When incremental building and ® nancing are not
linked , people can build a complete housing unit and enjoy the bene® ts
immediately. Payments made for the repayment of the housing loan or rent
enable the possibility of consuming now and paying for it later. However, with
the construction of complete dwelling units large loans are involved leading to
® nancial obligations over a long period of time. This is exactly what the poor try
to escape from as much as possible. The urban poor opt for an incremental
building process with only short or medium-term obligations. In other words,
the poor opt for a link between incremental building and incremental ® nancing.
Here, incremental ® nancing refers to the term of the loan, and not to the size of
the instalments as Malpezzi suggests . Even when, for instance, more ¯ exible
repayments can be developed by allowing periods of non-payment, the long-
term loan tends to jeopardise the survival strategies of the poor. Long-term loans
prevent the poor from taking out loans for other purposes. An indebted house
cannot provide its owner with the socio-economic security which enables the
owner to obtain ® nancial or non- ® nancial help at some future date.
Housing ® nance institutions are risk averse and tend to invest in areas where
they feel secure, which means they should know the target group. It appears that
the poor as a market segment are not well known or are considered dif® cult to
serve by private and public housing ® nance institutions. Serving the poor with
housing loans is dif® cult as long as the perceptions of policy-makers, economists
and managers of housing ® nance institutions con¯ ict with the needs and
perceptions and possibilities of the poor. There are several prejudices concerning
the poor. It is believed that the poor cannot decide which type of loan suits them
best and that the poor will overestimate their capacity to repay. Furthermore, the
urban poor are illiterate and lack experience with the formal ® nancial sector.
However, the poor do have experience with ® nance (savings and credit), but this
is restricted to the informal ® nancial sector (Lee, 1990, p. 76) where they
demonstrate perfectly rational behaviour. Breaking away from conventional
wisdom and introducing incremental ® nancingÐ or in other words micro-
® nancingÐ can be seen as an attempt to break the barriers formed by the
perceptions of middle and other upper classes. These perceptions determ ine
the terms and conditions of housing loans and the actual release of these loans
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from the formal housing ® nance institutions. Contrary to HUDCO, the policy of
the NHB attempts to break down the barriers by encouraging incremental
® nancing for an incremental building process. However, in practice, housing
® nance corporations are very hesitant about dealing with incremental ® nancing,
because the conventional criteria used for determining creditworthiness exclude
the poor.
Conclusion
It can be said that formal housing ® nance is linked to long-term credit, unlike the
short and medium terms in the informal sector. Long-term housing loans ® t the
housing construction practices and perceptions of the middle and upper classes.
Dominant middle and upper classes , as bene® ciaries, can more easily afford to
build a complete housing unit and ® nance it to a large extent with long-term
credit. Here, supply of and demand for housing ® nance do meet each other. The
urban poor, however, build their dwellings according to an incremental building
process, which requires short to medium-term credit. The provision of ready-
made buildings with long-term credit or rent obstructs their mobility and their
survival strategies, which encompass an avoidance of long-term ® nancial obliga-
tions. The need for incremental building and ® nancing is de® ned by the insecure
living conditions of the poor. Here, income poverty does not necessarily lead to
housing poverty if housing is built and ® nanced incrementally.
The concept of housing schemes for the urban poor with long-term credit is
not advisable. The danger of this mismatch between supply and demand is that
the poor will not be helped at all, but rather that they will be pushed below the
poverty line or even further below it. In addition, the poor are not necessarily
helped by credit alone. They are helped by access to ® nance on terms they can
manage. For the housing ® nance institutions the problem of screening the
repayment of the loans provided to the urban poor can be solved by making use
of social control mechanisms instead of conventional collateral. Social control
mechanisms function especially well in group- based savings and credit associ-
ations such as ROSCAs. In short, housing ® nance is trapped in a dilemma of
perceptions among the middle and upper classes, who as policy-makers,
economists, and managers of housing ® nance institutions, determine how the
housing ® nance institutions mainly ® x the term and conditions of housing loans
for the urban poor, and this must be challenged. The NHB’s attempts at breaking
open the trap and promoting incremental building and ® nancing on a limited
scale have not been successful. More efforts should be undertaken to demolish
the trap completely, to enable the delivery of micro-housing ® nance to the poor.
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